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RESUMEN 
En este artfculo se cuantifica el impacto de la politica autarquica fran-
quista sobre la economia espafiola haciendo uso del indicador del Coste 
Domestico de la Divisa. Este indicador compara el coste de oportunidad 
real de los factores primarios usados en la producci6n de un determinado 
bien con su valor agregado a precios internacionales. Los resultados indi-
can que la ineficiente asignaci6n de los factores productivos inducida por la 
intervencionista politica econ6mica tuvo como consecuencia una perdida 
significativa de eficiencia, ya que s6lo 50 de las 125 industrias estudiadas, o 
lo que es lo mismo s6lo el 39 por cien de la producci6n industrial, podian 
ser consideradas eficientes. Sin embargo, los resultados muestran tambien 
que, comparativamente, la economia espafiola se encontraba en una buena 
posici6n para beneficiarse de las reformas puestas en marcha en 1959, pues 
la mayor parte de la producci6n industrial no se encontraba demasiado ale-
jada de la eficiencia relativa. 
Palabras clave: autarquia, control de cambios, coste domestico de la 
divisa, sustituci6n de importaciones 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, a large volume of literature has addressed the empirical 
and theoretical shortcomings of studies which have attempted to explore 
the relationship between trade policy and growth. As a result, this rela-
tionship is seen as an open and somewhat controversial question. However, 
there is little doubt that the distortions created by a highly protectionist 
policy can lead to inefficient resource allocation, which in tum seriously 
affects accumulation and hence growth 1. This paper offers an approxima-
tion of the resource misallocation produced by the autarkic policy in Spain, 
measured by the Domestic Resource Cost (DRC), in order to assess the cost 
to the Spanish economy of the deviation from the international specialisa-
tion pattern. 
DRC is primarily an indicator of comparative advantage as it provides an 
intersectoral comparison of the relative efficiency of the economy in pro-
duction across sectors. Since it does not take actual trade flows into 
account, the DRC can be a good substitute for other indicators when 
barriers to trade have a significant influence on the configuration of the 
trade structure. Moreover, examined in conjunction with the goals and 
incentives supplied by economic policy, the DRC can also be used as an 
1 See Bhagwatti (1978), Krueger (1978) and! (1993) and Edwards (1993, 1998). 
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indicator of the impact of restrictions to external trade. It provides an 
approximation of the effects of trade policy on the efficiency of the alloca-
tion of production resources and hence of the influence of trade policy on 
the productive structure in a country. 
In the post-war decades many developing countries implemented an 
import substitution policy with the aim of rapid industrialisation. The 
main features of import substituting policies were complex exchange and 
import control systems, intense public direct intervention in industrial pro-
duction and factor and goods price regulations. In general, such policies 
implied considerable distortions of the price system resulting in significant 
losses of allocative efficiency. Spain, which had started its import substitu-
ting policies in 1939, maintained its inward looking development strategy 
for almost two more decades. It is widely recognised that this autarkic 
development policy had a negative impact on the country's economic 
growth. The argument is that the isolationist policies and the in tense inter-
ventions created many distortions in the Spanish economy which preven-
ted efficient resource allocation. However, it is not clear how big an impact 
these policies actually had . Some authors believe that these policies, which 
focused mainly on industrial development, had a crippling effect on the 
Spanish economy, while others point to the sustained growth of the 
Spanish industrial sector during the 1950s to argue that the distortions 
were not so great. 
The DRC has been calculated for the Spanish industrial sector in 1958. 
This is the last year in which autarkic policies were in effect and the year in 
which the first input-output table of the Spanish economy was compiled. 
Thus, this year provided the best possible data source to analyse the effects 
of the autarkic economic policy before it was abandoned. Our results indi-
cate that the Spanish economy, in fact, suffered considerable efficiency los-
ses and that industrial production could have been significantly increased 
simply by reallocation of productive factors among different sectors. The 
DRC is a static measure and hence does not capture any dynamic effects. In 
any case, allocative inefficiency could only have contributed negatively to 
long-term economic growth. The rapid expansion of the Spanish economy 
which followed the stabilisation and liberalisation plan of 1959 suggests a 
high degree of allocative inefficiency due to twenty years of intervention 
and, equivalently, a large scope for reallocation in the Spanish industrial 
sector at the end of the in terventionist period. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses the con-
cept of domestic resource cost and how it is measured. Section 2 presents 
the case of the Francoist policy as an example of industrialisation through 
import substitution. Section 3 describes our methodology for the estima-
tion of DRCs for Spanish industry in 1958. In section 4 we present our 
results and discuss them in the light of previous studies. Section 5 offers 
conclusions. 
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1. THE DOMESTIC RESOURCE COST AS A MEASURE 
OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
The DRC was first applied by the economic authorities of Israel in the 
1950s as an instrument in project appraisal, used as a investment criterion 
(Bruno 1963 and 1965). This indicator became popular, after the publica-
tions of Bruno and Krueger (1968), in the 1960s when the DRC was already 
used as an ex post indicator of the effect of economic policy in Israel and 
Turkey. With the same aim, Banerji and Donges (1974) estimated the DRC 
in Spain for 1962 and 1968. Since then, independent economists and inter-
national institutions like the World Bank have used the DRC to evaluate 
development policy in less developed countries 2. 
The idea behind DRC is to compare the domestic cost of producing a 
certain good with its value added at international prices. 
where: 
DRC = DC; 
I VA~ 
I 
DC; = domestic cost of production 
VA*; = value added at international prices 
Contrasting the DRCs of different activities provides an intersectoral 
comparison of relative efficiency, from which comparative advantage is 
derived. According to comparative advantage theory, in the absence of any 
distortions like tariffs or exchange restrictions, domestic production cost 
can differ from international production cost because of technological fac-
tors or resource endowment. The DRC can be seen as a measurement of the 
Ricardian concept of comparative advantage based on technological fac-
tors, which would be given by the physical factor intensities. At the same 
time, factor prices can be seen as the result of the relative scarcity of a 
country's factor endowments. The more abundant a factor is, the lower its 
relative price will be, and consequently those goods that are produced inten-
sively using this factor will have lower DRC. In this way, the Heckscher-
Ohlin contribution to the Ricardian theory would be also integrated in this 
index. Thus, DRC represents an integrated indicator of the comparative 
advantage of a country (Schydlowsky, 1984). 
In the calculation of DRC, factor prices should reflect real opportunity 
cost which are not always captured by market prices. Price distortions can 
2 See, among others, Greenaway and Milner (1990), Morris (1990), Alpine and Picket (1991), 
Gonzalez et al. (1993) and Weiss (1991). 
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originate from imperfections of the markets or state interventions. Both 
factors are especially important in less developed countries. In this sense it 
should be noted that DRC is a broad measure, since it incorporates not only 
the distortions created by tariff and exchange control policy but also other 
existing distortions in the economy at a point in time. These include, for ins-
tance, distortions created by state commerce, regulations of the financial 
sector, restrictions on foreign investment or the effect of labour policy. For 
this reason, DRC has been considered the ideal instrument to measure the 
efficiency loss in less developed countries where the distortions in the eco-
nomy are the result of a wide range of interventions by the state going well 
beyond tariffs. 
Using the standard notation of input-output tables, the DRC can be 
expressed as 
where: 
r1r; = requirement of factor h in the production of good i 
s1r = shadow price of factor h 
and p: = border price of good i. 
The ratio compares the cost of producing a unit of a certain good with 
the cost of importing the same good. Therefore DRC can be also be inter-
preted as a measure of the cost of saving (producing) a foreign currency 
unit by means of an import substitution policy (export promotion policy), 
which makes it more appealing in cases where foreign exchange is relatively 
scarce, as in many developing countries. Usually, however, the production 
of a certain good not only requires primary factors but also raw materials 
and intermediates, which can be either domestically manufactured or 
imported. As imported inputs are a foreign exchange cost which reduce 
value added at international prices, the calculation of DRC must take this 
cost into account. Formally the DRC for a particular good or sector, i, can 
be defined as 
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where: 
mi; = requirements of imported input j in the domestic production of a 
unit of good i 
pj = border price of input j. 
Moreover, it is also possible that some foreign factors are involved in the 
production process so that it would also be necessary to deduct the repa-
triated income of foreign owned primary factors. Then we have 
where all international prices have been normalised to unity and: 
rfi = requirements of imported factor fin the domestic production of a 
unit of good i 
vr = price of factor f 
In the denominator of the former expression we have, then, the diffe-
rence between the international value of a certain good and the foreign 
exchange paid for imported raw materials and primary factors. This is the 
net foreign exchange earned or saved by the economic activity. On the other 
hand, in the numerator we find the domestic real cost of production or the 
real added value generated by this activity. Therefore the DRC compares the 
real opportunity cost of the primary factors used in the production of goods 
with their value added at international prices. 
The higher the DRC, the larger the opportunity cost for the country in 
producing a particular good. Similarly, a lower DRC reflects a lower domes-
tic opportunity cost of producing a certain good. Moreover, the greater the 
dispersion of DRC among sectors, the higher the level of d istortion to which 
an economy is subjected. As Banerji and Donger (1974, p. 3) noted, «high 
and differential DRC are then an indicator of welfare losses resulting from 
the impact of trade-restricting or trade-promoting measures on relative pri-
ces» . 
There are two alternative concepts of DRC, namely, the direct and the 
total DRC 3. Up to this point we have been referring to the total DRC. While 
the total DRC (TDRC) takes into account the cost of all the factors required 
3 It is also possible to distinguish between m arginal DRC and average DRC, although this 
theoretical distinction has had no application in empirical studies (Fane, 1995). 
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directly and indirectly to produce i, the direct DRC (DDRC) only considers 
the cost of the factors employed directly by sector i. Thus DDRC can be used 
to evaluate the efficiency at each stage of the productive process, whereas 
the TDRC includes the efficiency of any earlier stage of the domestic pro-
duction process in the estimation. For instance, a high TDRC of motor vehi-
cle production could be the result of an inefficient steel and tyre production 
industry, while a high DDRC would be a reflection of the inefficiencies of 
the motor vehicle production sector itself. Hence, comparison of both mea-
sures of DRC for a particular sector will allow us to assess the extent to 
which the loss of efficiency in the final sector is due to earlier stages in the 
production process. 
2. SPANISH AUTARKIC POLICY 
Spain is a good example of the inward looking economic policies applied 
in less developed countries after the Second World War. After the Spanish 
Civil War (1936-1939), the authorities decided to force the rapid industria-
lisation of the country. Even though economic policy in Spain contained an 
idiosyncratic ideological and militaristic component, the policy measures 
adopted were very similar to those of other countries. Support of industria-
lisation was an important characteristic of the inward looking strategy of 
many developing countries at the time. Further, as in many other countries, 
the Spanish authorities were convinced that private initiative was either 
unable or unwilling to undertake the effort and that rapid industrialisation 
could only be achieved through direc t public intervention. On the other 
hand, exposure to international market forces would encourage specialisa-
tion in primary goods which would! accentuate dependency on foreign 
industrial goods. Overcoming this dependency was the main goal of the 
Spanish industrialisation programme, as Francoist economic policy res-
ponded to the idea that a strong industry was indispensable to guarantee 
the political independence of the Spanish state. 
For the first twenty years of the Franco regime a policy of autarky aimed 
at import substitution with the fundamental goal of guaranteeing the poli-
tical independence of the country was implemented. The two major featu-
res of the autarkic economic policy were systematic state intervention and 
intense and indiscriminate protectionism. The basic tools of the protectio-
nist policy were quantitative restrictions to trade and a highly restrictive 
exchange control system. For political considerations the official fixed 
exchange rate was clearly overvalued 4 • To compensate for this sustained 
4 The persistent inflation differential with Spain's main trading partners made this overva-
luation worsen over time. In spite of a significant devaluation in 1949, using the opportunity 
offered by the imposition of multiple exchange rates, the official weighted exchange rate after 
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overvaluation, rigid regulation of external trade was implemented. A com-
plex system of quotas and bilateral agreements accompanied by a trade 
licensing mechanism and, after 1948, by a multiple exchange rate system, 
affected both commercial and financ ial operations, isolating the Spanish 
economy from any form of external competition (Martinez Ruiz, 2000). In 
addition, the intense protectionism prevented the full exploitation of gains 
to specialisation and economies of scale and reduced the incentives of 
domestic firms to search for efficiency in production (Donges, 1976; 
Catalan, 1995; Prados and Sanz, 1996). 
Furthermore, the overvaluation of the peseta made it impossible for 
Spanish exports to take advantage of the buoyant situation of the European 
economy. Export stagnation and restrictions to foreign investment made 
foreign exchange a highly scarce resource. This scarcity affected raw material 
and equipment imports which were indispensable for consolidation of the 
growth of the Spanish economy. The high inflation reflected the imbalance 
between demand and supply 5. Although the availability of foreign exchange 
increased in the first half of the 1950s, thanks to improved access to in terna-
tional capital markets and to a fleeting increase in exports, this increase was 
insufficient to satisfy the growing need for imports which resulted from the 
accelerated expansion of the economy. Demand growth in in ternal markets, 
which could not be satisfied due to exchange scarcity and high protectionist 
trade barriers, allowed national producers to obtain some «Scarcity premia» 
(Donges, 1976). As a result, the prices of intermediate goods and raw mate-
rials went up rapidly in the 1950s 6 • Additionally, balance of payments deficit 
became the main problem of the Spanish economy after 1956. 
Foreign investors were restricted by law from owning more than 25 per 
cent of the equity of any firm. This, along with the fact that it was very dif-
ficult to repatriate any eventual profits, made Spain a very unattractive 
country for foreign investment. Isolation from international capital markets 
obliged the Spanish economy to rely on its own saving capacity. In the 
1950s, growing investment demand accompanied by the protectionist mea-
sures increased the relative price of machinery and equipment, decreasing 
returns on investment (Prados de la Escosura, 2003, and Cuhel and Sanchfs, 
2007) 7. In addition, the relatively small presence of foreign firms in the 
l 9S2 was still over 30 per cent higher than the black market exchange rate (Martfnez Ruiz, 2003 
and Martfn Acel\a, 1989). The devaluation of the official exchange rate in l 9S7 had almost no 
effect on this differential since the multiple exch ange rates were, in general, far above the offi-
cial rate of 10.9S pesetas per dollar. For example, in 19S6 the weighted exchange rate was 33.47 
pesetas/$ (Martfnez Ruiz, 2003). 
5 According to Prados de la Escosura and Sanz (1996, p. 368) consumer prices in Spain rose 
by an average of 13 per cent in the 1940s and 10 per cent in the l 9SOs. 
6 Donges (1976, p. SS) calculated that the prices of imported goods in the Spanish market 
multiplied by 2.S between 1948-1949 and 1958-l 9S9. 
7 According to the estimates of Cuhel and Sanchfs (2007) the relative price of capital goods 
with respect to consu mer goods increased by 60-80 per cent during the 19SOs. 
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Spanish market prevented national firms from gaining access to advanced 
production technology, which resulted in the use of obsolete and inefficient 
production processes. 
The second staple of Francoist economic policy was pervasive govern-
ment intervention and regulation of the economy. A comprehensive licen-
sing system for the creation and enlargment of firms made sure that the 
government controlled the development of the productive structure. Prices 
for agricultural and industrial goods, especially those considered essential 
for industrialisation, were also regulated and the distribution of some of 
these goods was partially centralised, although these controls were relaxed 
during the 1950s (de la Dehesa and others, 1991). As for factor markets, the 
Francoist government limited the increase of nominal wages which, in the 
face of rapid inflation growth, meant a deterioration of the average real 
wage of the working population (Vilar Rodriguez, 2004). The banking sec-
tor was subject to very strict regulations, which extended from regulated 
in terest rates, both for passive and active operations, to the imposition of 
compulsory investment coefficients (Pons, 1999 and 2001). Pons shows that 
the main objective of the regulation of financial markets was to bias resour-
ce allocation in favour of the authorities' preferred sectors (Pons, 1999). 
Direct in tervention in the industrial sector is another main feature of 
Francoist economic policy at the time. The creation of the Instituto 
Nacional de Industria (INI) marked the first important step of this inter-
ventionist policy. The INI, created in 1941, was responsible for the inves-
tments necessary to achieve rapid industrialisation. In principle, the INI's 
main objective was to achieve self-sufficiency in those sectors considered 
basic for the economy, such as the production of machinery and equipment 
and intermediates. The INI soon became the main actor in the Spanish 
industrial sector, capturing around 7 .5 per cent of the total capital formation 
in 1955 (42 per cent of the total public investment of that year) (Martin 
Acefia and Comin, 1991, p. 44) The government's preference for heavy 
industry and its negative effects have been widely recognised in the literatu-
re. The INI's intervention in highly capital intensive sectors along with the 
lack of consideration for economic criteria such as opportunity cost or 
return on investment resulted in an important waste of scarce resources 
(Martin Acefia and Comin, 1992; Prados and Sanz, 1996). In addition, this 
inefficient public sector became one of the main providers of basic and 
in termediate goods, which had a knock-on effect, passing its high cost struc-
ture on to the private sector. This resulted in an inefficient industrial sector 
with high costs which was unable to compete in international markets. 
However, industrial production grew rapidly during the autarkic period. 
After 10 years of very slow recovery, the rate of growth of Spanish industry 
increased notably between 1951and 1959 8• This growth has been ascribed 
8 There are different estimates. See Morella (1992) and Prados de la Escosura (2002). 
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to greater availability of imports, the progressive relaxation of some con-
trols in the domestic markets and the maturation of the big public inves-
tment projects of the previous decade (Barciela and others, 2001). 
Furthermore, an intense structural change in the secondary sector took 
place since heavy industry grew more rapidly than the consumer goods sec-
tor, mainly because of the intense public investment in those industries. 
This has led some authors to conclude that state intervention, especially 
through the INI, and protection were n ot only positive but indispensable to 
achieve such rapid development in Spain's industrial sector (Donges, 1976; 
Brana, Buesa and Molero, 1984). Nevertheless, as has been shown by other 
authors, the same results would have been possible using alternative poli-
cies which would have provided incentives for private activity. The estima-
tion of the DRC will now be used to evaluate the success of Spain's import 
substitution policy in achieving these goals. 
3. THE ESTIMATION OF DRC FOR THE SPANISH INDUSTRIAL 
SECTOR IN 1958 
The Stabilisation Plan introduced in July 1959 marked the beginning of 
the end of twenty years of massive intervention in the Spanish economy. 
With its incorporation into the main international economic organisations 
the Spanish government abandoned the inward looking policy followed 
since the Civil War. For the external sector, this resulted in the end of quan-
titative restrictions, multiple exchange rates and other mechanisms used 
during the previous two decades to address the recurring balance of pay-
ments problems. The year 1958 is, therefore, the last year in which autarkic 
policies were in effect. It is also the year in which the first input-output 
table for the Spanish economy was compiled. This year, then, provided the 
best possible data source to analyse the effects of the autarkic economic 
policy before it was abandoned. The DRC will give us some insight into the 
level of misallocation of resources in Spain before the wave of liberalisa-
tion. 
The DRC has been calculated for 125 industrial sectors including expor-
ting as well as import substituting sectors. For each sector both direct and 
total DRCs have been estimated. The TDRC formula used in the calcula-
tions is as follows 
where rh; and mi represent the total (direct and indirect) primary factors 
and imports respectively required for the production of good i, which have 
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been obtained from the 1958 Input-Output table. With respect to the DDRC, 
the expression is given by 
where: 
a,,; = direct requirement of factor h in the production of good i 
s,, = social price of factor h 
d,,; = requirement of non-traded good n in the production of good i 
a,,,, = direct requirement of factor h in the production of non-traded good n 
P; = world price of good i 
mi = total requirements (direct and indirect) of imported inputs in the 
production of good i. 
Besides the fact that TDRC considers total requirements and DDRC con-
siders only direct requirements, the second term of the numerator is diffe-
rent in both expressions. This term adds to the DRC calculation the primary 
resources needed to produce good i by taking into account the non-tradable 
inputs used in its productive process 9• This expression, therefore, is a com-
prehensive measure of the domestic cost which is incurred by producing a 
unit of foreign currency 10. 
The calculation of the DRC requires that production factors be valued at 
their real opportunity cost, so it is necessary to calculate a shadow price set. 
In this respect, the approach adopted has been to estimate their payment in 
the most probable alternative activity, which means that the shadow prices 
are understood as the social opportunity cost of using these productive fac-
tors in a particular activity. This requires an examination of the factor mar-
kets in Spain at the end of the autarkic period. 
With respect to the labour market, it was characterised by under employ-
ment and administrative measures meant to guarantee full employment. 
This, along with the diverse regulations concerning minimum wage and 
social contributions, make it reasonable to think that wages were above the 
opportunity cost of labour, which was the relatively abundant factor in the 
Spanish economy. Following Greenaway and Milner (1990), a shadow price 
for labour was calculated by applying a markdown to the prevailing level of 
9 This is not necessary in the case of total DRC, since direct and indirect requirements of 
primary factors are included. 
10 It must be noted that none of our estimates of DRC account for the effect of repatriated 
income of foreign owned primary factors. This exclusion is due partly to data constraints and 
partly to the negligible role of repatriations in autarkic Spain given the extremely restrictive 
legislation. 
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wages based on the average wage differential between different labour cate-
gories. The shadow price of labour, w5 , is thus given by 
( \! +\!) W s = W 1- a 2 s 
where \1 a is the percentage wage differential between agricultural occupa-
tion and unskilled occupation in industry and \1
5 
is the percentage wage dif-
ferential between skilled and unskilled occupations in industry and services. 
These data were unavailable for 1958 so data from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadlstica for the next year, 1959, were used 11 • As a result of this adjus-
tment our estimate for the social wage is 35 per cent below the prevailing 
level of wages in 1958. 
In the case of capital, the calculation was more complex. The intensive 
regulation of the financial sector distorted the profitability between sectors 
to the extent that a method similar to that used for labour proved not to be 
feasible. Furthermore, both the magnitude of the distortion and the sign are 
difficult to determine. On the one hand, the presumed relative scarcity of 
capital leads us to think that in certain cases the return on capital was 
below its marginal productivity. This was surely the case for capital inves-
ted by banks as a result of the compulsory coefficient or capital borrowed 
subject to the maximum interest rate legislation. The high rate of indebted-
ness of Spanish industrial firms also seems to suggest that interest rates 
may have been below the opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, the 
fact that the Spanish economy had a high degree of protectionism and high 
barriers to entry suggests that, in some industries at least, it was possible to 
obtain sustained returns above the opportunity cost of capital. In order to 
deal with all these questions, data concerning profitability rate and the capi-
tal structure in each industry would be required but unfortunately such 
data are not available. An assumption is made that the net effect of govern-
ment intervention was to set the cost of capital below its true opportunity 
cost, and a range of estimates of the DRC is obtained by assuming that the 
social opportunity cost of capital was between 10 and SO per cent higher 
than the actual rate of return 12. 
The international prices of traded goods, understood as border prices, 
have been approximated following the standard expression 
11 Data were obtained from INE (1987) and Maluquer de Motes (1989). 
12 A similar approach is used, for example, in the estimate for Colombia in 1969 (Hutchen-
son and Schydlowsky, 1982), Argentina in 1969 (Berlinski and Schydlowsky, 1982) and 1973 
(Szychowski and Perazzo, 1981) and Turkey (Krueger, 1978) in the late 1960s. As Bhagwati (1978) 
pointed out, such shadow prices •Should be regarded essentially as sensitivity estimates., p. 90. 
The chosen range is in line with those used in the aforementioned studies. 
450 
AUTARKIC POLICY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE SPANISH INDUSTRIAL SECTOR ... 
where di is the protection level for good i. Each d-factor was calculated 
based on the prevailing tariff corresponding to the sector division of the I-
O table and the penalties (premia) implicit in the multiple exchange rate 
system applicable in 1958. Specifically, the official exchange rate -42 pese-
tas/$- is taken as a reference and any rate above (under) this rate is consi-
dered a tax (subsidy) for an import good, whereas the opposite is true for 
export goods. A good is considered an export good if its export-production 
ratio is higher than 10 per cent and if its exports are greater than its 
imports. In April 1957 a first attempt to rationalise the exchange policy was 
made when the peseta was devalued from 10.95 pesetas per dollar - the 
official exchange rate of the peseta from 1939- to 42 pesetas per dollar. The 
devaluation was accompanied by a unification of the exchange rate. 
However, this measure was reversed a few weeks later and, de facto, the 
system of multiple exchange rates was restored. At the end of 1958 the mul-
tiple exchange rate system had 10 exchange rate categories for exports (ran-
ging from 31 to 95 pesetas per dollar) and 4 for imports (42 to 126 pesetas 
per dollar). Finally the indirect taxes applicable to imported goods were 
taken into account. Due to the paucity of disaggregated information, an ave-
rage tax rate was used 13• 
In order to determine the activities in which an economy enjoys a com-
parative advantage and in which it s hould therefore specialise, it will be 
necessary to compare the DRC of each sector with the shadow exchange 
rate (SER). In an economy with distortions, the DRC can be higher or lower 
than the SER depending on the sector. If in a particular sector the DRC is 
higher than the SER, this means that it would be possible to use resources 
in a more efficient way by transferring the productive factors to an alterna-
tive activity and importing the good in question. Following the Bruno and 
Krueger approach, the SER should reflect the social cost of producing a 
unit of foreign exchange in the economy under study. Since the sectoral 
DRCs give the cost of producing a unit of foreign exchange in each sector, 
a widely used solution is to calculate an average or weighted average DRC 
and to use it as the cut-off point. In our case, the average total DRC of all 
tradable sectors, including the agricultural sector, has been calculated. This 
average, a, can be viewed, as noted by Pearson, Akrasanee and Nelson as 
the average efficiency of all activities producing tradable goods in the eco-
nomy in transforming domestic resources into foreign exchange (1976, 
13 Information on taxes was obtained from Fuentes Quintana (1963) and Fuentes Quintana 
and Albifiana (1967). It must be pointed out tha t no adjustment could be made for the protec-
tionist effect of quantitative restrictions to trade due to lack of data. 
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p. 88). The a-factor can be interpreted as the relationship between the offi-
cial exchange rate and its shadow price (SER), 
SER= a * E 
where E is the official exchange rate .. The resulting value for a (a = 1.27) 
implies that the SER would stand at 53.30 ptas/$. This SER is in fact simi-
lar to the current exchange rate on the black market located in Tangier 
(54.99 pts/$) (Martfn Acefia, 1989). The difference between the official 
exchange rate and the estimated SER (about 27 per cent) gives a first indi-
cation of the failure of the autarkic policy in allocating resources efficiently. 
4. RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 125 activities according to their 
TDRC for three different values of the shadow return on capital. For sim-
plicity, the TDRC figures have been normalised to 1. A TDRC value below 1 
indicates that the activity is relatively efficient while a value above unity 
indicates relative inefficiency. The table shows that the choice of shadow 
price of capital does not have much influence on the ranking of activities 14• 
For our central case only SO out of the 125 industries could be considered 
efficient. Figure 1 shows the percentage of industrial output falling in a par-
ticular DRC range. The production of the efficient sectors accounted for 
38.51 per cent of Spanish industrial production and 26.71 per cent of the 
production of tradable goods. 
Figure 1 allows us to draw some preliminary conclusions about the 
situation of the Spanish industrial sector in the final stages of the autarkic 
policy. Firstly, the large spread in the DRC values suggests a significant 
scope for increasing welfare through the reallocation among the different 
industrial sectors. The two measures of dispersion used, the standard devia-
tion and the coefficient of variation, provide an indication of the negative 
impact of the Francoist policies. The coefficient of variation of the TDRC in 
industry is 28 per cent, while the dispersion is greater in the case of the 
DDRC, reaching 41 per cent 15• This suggests substantial inefficiency in the 
allocation of resources in the Spanish economy. 
14 This means that, although they refer only to the results for this central value, the follo-
wing comments would be also valid for any value of the shadow price of capital. To test this, 
correlation coefficients between the different rankings obtained have been calculated. The results 
are very close to 1, which indicates a high degree of consistency between the different rankings. 
See Appendix 1. 
15 It must be noted that these numbers are not high compared with the values obtained by 
other studies. For instance, Donges obtained a coefficient of variation above 66 per cent for the 
Spanish economy in 1962 (Donges, 1976, p. 223). 
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FIGURE 1 
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Secondly, although the majority of industry could be considered relatively 
inefficient, many industries were situated at the edge of the cut-off point -
42.38 per cent of the industrial product ion has a TDRC in the 1.0-1.25 range. 
This indicates that, in spite of the obvious misallocation of resources, 
Spanish industry did not need to make a radical transformation in order to 
improve its performance. This, in turn, would suggest that the Spanish 
industrial sector could take advantage of a relatively small change in econo-
mic policy, i.e. a devaluation, a liberalisation of the labour market or incom-
plete import liberalisation, to improve its performance significantly. 
The work of Asensio, who studied the comparative advantage of the 
Spanish economy for the same year (1958), allows us to check the consistency 
of our DRC results. Using several indicators of revealed comparative advan-
tage, Asensio found that the Spanish economy enjoyed comparative advanta-
ge in 26 out of the 64 sectors in the Department of Customs classification 16• 
Of these 26, 1 is an agricultural good and 7 others do not have equivalent sec-
tors in the input-output classification. Of the remaining 18 industrial goods 
present in the input-output table, 16 have a sectoral TDRC lower than 1. 
16 The results are compared with the indicator referred to as «relative advantage to trade 
balance• by Asensio and defined as VCR;, _ [(X,,-Mit)l(X 11+M,,)) - (I (X11-M1t)/I (X;,+M,,)] (Asensio, 
1995, pp. 322 and 606). The data she used come from the Trade Statistics compiled by the Direc-
ci6n General de Aduanas (Department of Customs). 
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TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF TDRC BY DIFFERENT SPK 
TDRC SPK = 1.15 SPK = 1.25 SPK = 1.5 
0.5-0.749 19 19 19 
0.75-0.999 31 31 30 
1.0-1.249 52 52 51 
1.25-1.499 15 15 18 
1.5-1.749 5 4 3 
1.75-1.999 2 3 3 
> 2 1 1 1 
Our results, then, are broadly consistent with those of Asensio. The DRC 
ranking is also consistent with the actual export pattern of the Spanish eco-
nomy of the time. Among the higher ranked sectors in the DRC classification 
are many of the traditionally important export sectors of Spain such as iron 
ore, olive oil and cork. Figure 2 studies the relationship between export per-
formance and DRC values. This figure plots the cumulative distribution of 
DRC values for the 23 most important industrial exporting sectors for Spain 
in 1958 and for the industrial sector as a whole 17 • The cumulative distribution 
clearly indicates the higher efficiency of the exporting sectors (the distribu-
tion for industrial exports statistically dominates that of all manufacturing 
sectors). The average DRC of a dollar in the export industries was well below 
the general shadow exchange rate (44.02 pts/$ vs. 53.3 pts/$). The import 
competing sectors showed an average DRC per dollar very close to the gene-
ral exchange rate (54.14 pts/$), while the import sectors were among the most 
inefficient with a shadow exchange rate of 57.63 pts/$ 18• Apart from the food 
industry and the minerals sector, other sectors had both a low DRC and a high 
export performance. These include cotton weaving and silk products which 
were among the efficient sectors according to the DRC criterion and were two 
of the most important industrial exports at the end of the autarkic period 19• 
The situation of the Spanish economy in 1958 can be compared with 
that of other developing economies or economies in transition. Figure 3 
presents DRC distributions for the Argentine economy in the 1970s and 
several Eastern European countries in the late 1980s alongside our results, 
all normalised to 1 20• Absolute values of the DRCs are not directly compa-
17 Of the 50 main export products, 19 were agricultural products and therefore could not be 
considered. When these sectors are considered, the relation between exports and a low TDRC is 
strengthened. 
18 Similar estimates for the Korean economy in 1968 showed significantly worse results for 
the import competing sector (Westphal and Kim, 1982, p. 24 7). 
19 A full list of all the sectors ranked according to their DRC can be found in Appendix 2. 
20 Results for Argentina in 1973 are taken from Szychowski and Perazzo (1981) while results 
for the Eastern European economies are taken from Hughes and Hare (1992). 
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FIGURE2 
CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DRC FOR THE EXPORT 
SECTOR AND ALL SECTORS 
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rable as the studies considered use different methodologies. However the 
distribution, and in particular the dispersion, of the DRCs can provide an 
indication of relative levels of allocative efficiency in these economies. 
Two distinct groups of countries can be identified. Spain, Argentina and 
Poland have a distribution of DRCs clearly centred around 1, while 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia have a more dispersed distribution 
and a relatively large frequency of values above 3. Furthermore, the negati-
ve DRCs for the latter countries indicate that some sectors in these coun-
tries had negative added value in absolute terms (their outputs had less 
value than their inputs). This suggests. that there are two levels of allocative 
inefficiency in the cases considered and that, in spite of the significant 
scope for reallocation of resources, the degree of restructuring required by 
the economies of Spain (1958), Argentina (1973) and Poland (1988) was less 
severe than those of Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the late 
1980s. 
Table 2 and figure 4 show our results distinguishing between different 
sectors. The fact that the range of TDRCs overlaps across different sectors 
suggests that comparative advantage was not concentrated in any particu-
lar sector. The sector with the lowest TDRC is espadrilles in the consumer 
goods industry. However it is the food and drinks sector which occupies 
most of the highest slots in the ranking. This includes industries based on 
agricultural inputs, such as sectors related to the processing of olives, inclu-
ding olive oil production, and with cereal production, like milling and bakery 
industries. Intermediate goods and raw material industries such as fertilisers 
or the processing of cork and leather also appear among the most efficient 
sectors. Extractive activities are also in the top positions of the efficiency 
TABLE 2 
RANGE OF TDRC BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Food and drinks Max 1.848 
Min 0.618 
Extractive industries Max 0.930 
Min 0.696 
Textile industries Max 1.518 
Min 0.725 
Other consumer goods Max 1.508 
Min 0.573 
Intermediates Max 1.342 
Min 0.653 
Machinery and Equipment Max 2.554 
Min 0.821 
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FIGURE4 
TDRC DISTRIBUTION BY SECTORS 
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ranking and, contrary to what may be expected, the coal industry achieves a 
better ranking than the more traditional iron ore or pyrite industries. 
Among the sectors to obtain high efficiency results are petroleum products 
and the defence industry. The high degree of efficiency shown by the petro-
leum sector is probably due to the intensive use of imported inputs in its pro-
duction process and therefore its weak interrelationship with the domestic 
economy 21 • In the case of the defence industry, the literature on the Spanish 
defence industry suggests that this sector was in fact characterised by consi-
derable inefficiency (Martinez Ruiz, 1994; San Roman, 1999) 22• However, in 
our analysis it obtains a high efficiency score which is likely due to the limi-
tations of data available to calculate the border prices for this particular 
industry where import-export operations are especially opaque 23. A substan-
tial proportion of the machinery and equipment sectors is found to be ineffi-
2 1 It must be pointed out that many authors think that the DRC criterion biases the ranking 
in favour of those sectors which make intensive use of imported inputs (Masters and Winter-
Nelson, 1995). 
22 Its position, 37m among export products, can be explained in part by the existence of small 
weapons manufacturers producing pistols and hunting arms which are believed to have been 
relatively competitive. 
23 For instance, the protection provided to this kind of goods does not appear in the official 
data of tariffs or multiple exchange rates. 
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cient in the sense of having a DRC greater than one. These activities include 
the motor vehicles industry, most notably automobiles, railroad materials, 
shipbuilding, the basic iron and steel industry, metal products, building mate-
rials and the machinery industry which were some of the most inefficient sec-
tors in the Spanish economy. These were precisely the sectors which the eco-
nomic authorities wanted to help through their policies. The main aim of 
Francoist industrial policy was to provide the Spanish economy with a strong 
and fully-developed industrial sector, with a focus on heavy industry. These 
sectors not only enjoyed all the incentives provided by the «National Industry 
Promotion and Protection» legislation of 1939, but also absorbed most of the 
public investment, channelled mainly through the National Industry Institute 
(INI) (Martin Acefia and Comin, 1992, pp. 147-263). In 1955, three sectors, 
namely iron and steel, metallurgy and metal products, mainly shipbuilding, 
accounted for 35 per cent of the investment of the INI. In 1960, after the cre-
ation and consequent expansion of Ensidesa - the biggest iron and steel con-
glomerate- this quota was raised to 50.8 per cent (Martin Acefia and Comin, 
1992, p. 152). Likewise, consistent with the interventionist philosophy of the 
Francoist authorities, public enterprises played the leading role -or at least 
a very important one- in most of these sectors. So, in 1960, approximately 
79 per cent of Spanish cars, 47 per cent of ships, 60 per cent of manmade 
fibres, 28 per cent of steel, 78 per cent of aluminium and 40 per cent of nitra-
tes were produced in public factories. The disappointing results of these pam-
pered sectors reveal the high opportunity cost of the industrial policy of the 
Spanish government. The results also reveal that, as could be expected, the 
protection provided by tariff and exchange control policies was concentrated 
in the least efficient sectors and had not been able to create any new segment 
of comparative advantage. The sectoral TDRCs have a high correlation (.98) 
with the level of protection enjoyed by each industry. 
Not only heavy industry, but also some of the most important sectors in 
the consumer goods industry were in the bottom positions of the efficiency 
ranking. Notably, the textile sector had a relatively high inefficiency level, 
despite the fact that it was labour intensive, i.e. used the relatively more 
abundant factor. The same was true for some of the most important sectors 
in the food and drinks industry. It can be seen in table 3 that part of these 
sectors' inefficiency was caused by other sectors which represented inputs 
to their production. Table 3 ranks each sector with respect to the difference 
between TDRC and DDRC. Since TDRC reflects the total opportunity cost 
of converting domestic resources into foreign exchange and the DDRC 
reflects the same cost but only in the final phase of the production process, 
the difference between the two is a measure of the inefficiency imposed on 
a sector by the rest of the economy 24. The presence of activities in the food 
24 Banerji and Donges (1974, pp. 20, 31-34), on the contrary, adjust the calculation if one 
(or some) of the main productive inputs was imported instead of domestically produced. 
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TABLE 3 
RANKING OF INDUSTRIES ACCORDING 
TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TOTAL AND DIRECT DRC 
Sector 
1 Automobile industry 
2 Grain mills 
3 Wine alcohols 
4 Cookies 
5 Sugar 
6 Knitted wool garments 
7 Wool spinning 
8 Condensed and powder milk 
9 Canned vegetables 
10 Wool weaving and finished cloths 
11 Clothing 
12 Common and industrial soap 
13 Wine industry 
14 Paper and cardboard manufactures 
15 Hard fibres weaving (sacks and cords) 
16 Non-ferrous metals industry 
17 Wood preparation and sawing 
18 Soup noodles 
19 Animal feed 
20 Wool cleaning industries 
21 Industrial alcohols 
22 Other dairy industries 
23 Wax and paraffin 
24 Slaughterhouses 
25 Oils and fat decomposition 
26 Bicycles 
27 Rice mills 
28 Milling industries 
29 Elaboration of spices 
30 Opening and cleaning cotton industries 
31 Colorants 
32 Plastics raw materials 
33 Railroad materials 
34 Oils, fats and margarines 
35 Canned fish 
36 Glycerine distilling 
37 Industrial oils and fats 
38 Elaboration of industrial flour 
39 Carbon hydrates and adhesives 
40 Meat and animal fats industries 
Industry 
Machinery and Equipment 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Textile industries 
Textile industries 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Textile industries 
Other consumer goods industries 
Intermediates 
Food and drinks 
Other consumer goods industries 
Textile industries 
Machinery and Equipment 
Intermediates 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Textile industries 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Intermediates 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Machinery and Equipment 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 




Machinery and Equipment 
Food and drinks 
Food and drinks 
Intermediates 
Intermediates 
Food and drinks 
Intermediates 
Food and drinks 
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and drinks sector in the leading positions in table 3 suggests that, although 
many of the basic inputs came from highly efficient agricultural sectors, the 
efficiency of the wine derivatives, canned vegetables and canned fish sectors 
was significantly reduced as a result of the inefficiencies of other sectors in 
the economy, most notably by an inefficient tin production sector in the 
case of the last two 25 • 
Supporting evidence in this sense is provided by the comparison of the 
results of this study with the results obtained by Banerji and Donges (1974) 
for 1968. Although the values of the DRC cannot be compared directly, the 
position of certain sectors in the ranking of each year can be compared 26 • 
Table 4 shows the results of this comparison. This table shows that the most 
important industries in the food and drinks sector, such as canned vegeta-
bles and fish, the wine industry, sugar or fortified wines, significantly 
improved their positions in the ranking after the Stabilisation and 
Liberalisation plan of 1959. The improvement in these sectors may suggest 
that they were able to obtain cheaper inputs either through international 
trade or as result of the improvement in domestic efficiency. In contrast, in 
the textile industry, only the first phases in the production process - prepa-
ration of raw materials and spinning- improved their ranking immediately 
after the Liberalisation plan. This suggests that the relative advantage of 
Spanish textile producers was questionable. By 1968, every textile sector 
- preparation of raw material, spinning, clothes and others- had improved 
its position in the ranking. 
The results at a more aggregate level are summarised in table 5. As 
expected, the most efficient sector was the so-called export agriculture sec-
tor which includes citrus fruits, olives, grapes, bananas, other fruits, nuts 
and vegetables. Traditional agriculture was the next most efficient sector. 
Both sectors have a weighted average TDRC below the cut-off point. The 
lower TDRC in agriculture, both traditional and export agriculture, reinfor-
ces the idea that economic policy particularly affected those final products 
sectors which had a very intense relationship with the domestic productive 
network, while those sectors where domestic inputs were less necessary or 
less important, were less affected by intervention and thus were relatively 
more efficient. However, this does not mean that the traditional agriculture 
sector was an efficient sector on its own. Its DDRC was the highest in the 
whole economy which suggests that t he opportunity cost of production in 
traditional agriculture was relatively high 21. 
25 A similar case is mentioned by Krueger for the Turkish canned food sector (Krueger, 1978, 
pp. 224-225). 
26 A direct comparison of the DRC values is n ot appropiate because the methodologies used 
are very different. 
27 The DRC is a measure of relative and not absolute efficiency. The results obtained do not 
indicate that traditional agriculture was efficient, but that it was cheaper in terms of internal 
resources to produce a dollar of wheat in Spain than a dollar of automobiles and, thus, that it 
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TABLE4 
COMPARISON OF SECTOR RANKINGS IN DIFFERENT YEARS 
Positions climbed in the ranking Positions descended in the ranking 
between 1958-68 between 1958-68 
Automobile industry 45 Basic metallic industries -3 
Sugar 34 Slaughterhouses -4 
Grain Milling 26 Knitted garments fabrication -5 
Canned vegetable 25 Cement industry -5 
Edible Alcohols 23 Aircraft -6 
Oil and fat industries 21 Precision instruments -7 
Wine Industries 18 Paper and cardboard manufactures -9 
Wood preparation and sawing 18 Transformation of plastic materials - 11 
Dairy Industry 16 Iron and steel industry - 11 
Clothes 14 Manmade materials fabricates - 12 
Other food industries 13 Non ferrous metals industry - 14 
Tanning industries 11 Basic chemistry and fertilisers - 15 
Canned fish 9 Soap, washing powder and perfumes - 16 
Petroleum refineries and lubricants 9 Metallic fabricates - 17 
Preparation of textile row materials 
and spinning 7 Motorcycles and bicycles - 17 
Other textile industry 7 Paper and paper paste industries - 19 
Other drinks 6 Metallic products for construction - 19 
Meat industries 4 Editorials and printing -20 
Bakery and Pastry industries 2 Electric machinery -21 
Rubber industries 2 Other machinery -22 
Jewellery and toys -22 
Railway materials industry -23 
Glass -26 
Shipbuilding -29 
Wood transformation industries -30 
Footwear -36 
Leather products -36 
Weaving industries -41 
Cork industries -41 
Source: Banerji and Donges (1974), p. 29. 
As for industry, the consumer goods sector obtains the best results, 
although it cannot be considered efficient, while the highest weighted ave-
would have been more rational to devote resources to sectors which produced at a lower resource 
cost than to insist, for instance, on having an industry which produced propellers for airplanes 
(this would have freed up resources overall which could have been invested in improving pro-
ductivity of the economy as a whole). The difference between TDRCs and DDRCs gives us an 
indication of this relative inefficiency: interventionist policy resulted in an increase in produc-
tion costs which was in direct relation to the intensity in the use of intermediate inputs produ-
ced domestically. It is therefore evident that industrial activities had to be relatively Jess efficient 
than agriculture in general and traditional agriculture in particular, which was undercapitalised 
and had a low use of machinery and fertilising and fitosanitary products. 
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TABLE 5 
TOTAL AND DIRECT DRC. SECTORAL AGGREGATION 
N° of 
DDRC DDRC TDRC TDRC 
sectors Simple Weighted Simple Weighted 
Average Average Average Average 
Traditional agriculture 30 0.835 0.772 1.071 1.111 
Export agriculture 8 0.774 0.787 0.885 0.886 
Intermediates 44 0.737 0.768 1.3 1.326 
Consumer goods 62 0.664 0.482 1.378 1.295 
Machinery 
and equipment 19 0.825 0.792 1.456 1.537 
General 163 0.731 0.667 1.269 1.269 
rage TDRC was the equipment and m achinery industry. Under the DDRC 
criterion, the consumer goods industry appears to be remarkably efficient. 
The large difference between the weighted averages of the TDRC and DDRC 
shows once again that this sector was the main victim of Francoist policy. 
The importance and relative efficiency of this sector is further evidenced by 
the fact that no other industrial sector in the economy obtained a DDRC 
below the general average. Moreover, t he average results are very similar in 
all other sectors. This suggests that, considered in isolation, that is, without 
considering the relationships with other sectors in the economy, all sectors 
-excluding the consumer goods industry- turned domestic resources into 
foreign exchange at a very similar cost. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper attempts to assess the impact of Francoist economic policy 
during the autarkic period (1939-1958) on the Spanish economy and on 
individual industrial sectors through an analysis of Domestic Resource 
Costs (DRC). The DRC was estimated for 1958 which marks the end of the 
autarkic period. As is common with this type of studies, the main problems 
revolve around the estimation of shadow prices. The lack of data to calcu-
late the opportunity costs of the productive factors, which are understood 
as their payment in the most probable alternative activity, has resulted in 
the need to adopt some major assumptions regarding their possible values, 
especially for the shadow price of capital. Despite the fact that sensitivity 
analysis allows us to conclude that the overall results are quite robust to the 
assumptions made, the details in the case of individual sectors must be 
taken with a certain degree of caution. 
The results of the DRC estimations indicate that in 1958 the most effi-
cient activities of the Spanish economy comprised export agriculture. This 
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suggests that twenty years of an interventionist economic policy centred on 
industrialisation had been unable to develop a competitive manufacturing 
sector as reflected in the small share of industrial goods in Spanish exports 
at the time. Furthermore, significant differences in efficiency can be obser-
ved within the secondary sector. The results demonstrate the negative impact 
of the Francoist policy on the use of domestic inputs and machinery on the 
most efficient industries, i.e. consumer goods. This effect is most notable in 
industries such as food, textiles and toys. In spite of being consistent with the 
general objective of a forced industrialisation, which is the promotion of 
heavy industry to the detriment of ligiht industry, this adverse impact must 
have been very damaging for the Spanish economy. The machinery and 
equipment sector was also negatively affected by these policies, although in 
this case the results show that these activities were inherently inefficient 
irrespective of the rest of the economy. Less than 2 .8 per cent of the produc-
tion of these industries could be considered efficient, despite the fact they 
had been the main targets of the industrial policy for almost 20 years. 
In general the results point to significant inefficiencies in the Spanish 
economy. These are reflected in the difference between the shadow price of 
exchange and the official exchange rate and the large coefficient of varia-
tion of DRCs. Our results indicate that the inefficient allocation of produc-
tive factors induced by the interventionist economic policy resulted in a sig-
nificant loss for the economy, since the production of the more inefficient 
(efficient) sectors was over (under) expanded. A welfare gain could therefo-
re have been achieved by a reallocation of resources within industry, from 
heavy industry to the consumer good sectors. These estimates provide an 
indication of the negative effect of the Francoist economic policies up to 
1958, although the fact that most industrial production was close to relati-
ve efficiency suggests that the overall negative impact of economic policy on 
the industrial sector was not that large. The fact that the Spanish economy 
revealed a notable potential for growth following the Stabilisation and 
Liberalisation Plan of 1959 seems to confirm that it was in a good enough 
position to take advantage of the opportunities created by reform. 
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APPENDIX 1 
In this appendix the correlation coefficients between the different results 
obtained under three different hypotheses over the shadow price of capital 
are calculated. The shadow price of capital has been expressed as a margin 
above the actual price. CDD (0.1), CDD (0.25) and CDD (0.50) denote the 
vector of DRCs when the value of this margin is 10, 25 and 50 per cent res-
pectively. The following table shows the Pearson correlation coefficient for 
these vectors. In all cases the correlation is very close to 1 and statistically 
significant with a confidence level greater than .001 per cent, which indica-
tes the strong linear relationship between the variables. 
Pearson coefficients 
TDRC (O. l ) TDRC (0.25) TDRC (0.5) 
TDRC (0.1) 0.9996 0.9965 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
TDRC (0.25) 0.9996 0.9984 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
TDRC (0.5) 0.9965 0.9984 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
The robustness of these results in front of atypical values has been tes-
ted using Spearman's analysis of rank correlation. 
Spearman coefficients 
TDRC (O. l ) TDRC (0.25) TDRC (0.5) 
TDRC (0.1) 0.9993 0.9947 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
TDRC (0.25) 0.9993 0.9972 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
TDRC (0.5) 0.9947 0.9972 
(0.0000) (0.0000) 
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APPENDIX 2. RANKING OF INDUSTRIES BY TDRC 
SECTOR TDRC DDRC 
Espadrilles 0.727 0.432 
Elaboration of cider 0.784 0.444 
Processed olives 0.794 0.380 
Fishery processing products (oil and meal) 0.796 0.409 
Jewellery and accessories 0.811 0.781 
Cork manufactures 0.829 0.512 
Technical leathers 0.838 0.353 
Cork first transformation 0.865 0.256 
Ceramics 0.874 0.707 
Lignite 0.884 0.841 
Oil olive and subproducts 0.900 0.208 
Other non ferrous/metallic minerals 0.904 0.786 
Natural resins 0.907 0.270 
Common salt 0.907 0.847 
Charcoal 0.912 0.486 
Masonry 0.917 0.862 
Cotton weaving and final cloths 0.920 0.417 
Limes and gypsum 0.929 0.569 
Pyrites 0.950 0.905 
Perfumes and cosmetics 0.963 0.499 
Anthracite 0.967 0.930 
Slaughterhouses 0.973 0.068 
Edible oils refinery 0.976 0.337 
Salted and dried fish 0.988 0.355 
Coal 0.989 0.929 
Furniture and other wood manufactures 0.990 0.512 
Bakery industry 0.997 0.253 
Press and graphic arts 1.003 0.652 
Coal agglomerates 1.009 0.386 
Defence industry (including aircraft) 1.042 0.506 
Organic chemistry 1.052 0.413 
Rice mills 1.055 0.169 
Milling industries 1.071 0.187 
Stones and abrasives industries 1.075 0.846 
Iron ore 1.076 1.005 
Nitrate fertilisers 1.102 0.492 
Meat and animal fats industries 1.134 0.320 
Other leather industries 1.143 0.610 
Other fertilisers 1.157 0.591 
Oilseeds milling 1.177 0.615 
Other ferrous/metallic minerals 1.178 1.063 
Coal and wood distillation 1.180 0.514 
Petroleum products (petrol and lubricants) 1.193 1.092 
Animal feed 1.195 0.266 
Elaboration of industrial flour 1.207 0.389 
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SECTOR TDRC DDRC 
Espadrilles 0.727 0.432 
Elaboration of cider 0.784 0.444 
Processed olives 0.794 0.380 
Fishery processing products (oil and meal) 0.796 0.409 
Jewellery and accessories 0.811 0.781 
Cork manufactures 0.829 0.512 
Technical leathers 0.838 0.353 
Cork first transformation 0.865 0.256 
Ceramics 0.874 0.707 
Lignite 0.884 0.841 
Oil olive and subproducts 0.900 0.208 
Other non ferrous/metallic minerals 0.904 0.786 
Natural resins 0.907 0.270 
Common salt 0.907 0.847 
Charcoal 0.912 0.486 
Masonry 0.917 0.862 
Cotton weaving and final cloths 0.920 0.417 
Limes and gypsum 0.929 0.569 
Pyrites 0.950 0.905 
Perfumes and cosmetics 0.963 0.499 
Anthracite 0.967 0.930 
Slaughterhouses 0.973 0.068 
Edible oils refinery 0.976 0.337 
Salted and dried fish 0.988 0.355 
Coal 0.989 0.929 
Furniture and other wood manufactures 0.990 0.512 
Bakery industry 0.997 0.253 
Press and graphic arts 1.003 0.652 
Coal agglomerates 1.009 0.386 
Defence industry (including aircraft) 1.042 0.506 
Organic chemistry 1.052 0.413 
Rice mills 1.055 0.169 
Milling industries 1.071 0.187 
Stones and abrasives industries 1.o75 0.846 
Iron ore 1.076 1.005 
Nitrate fertilisers 1.102 0.492 
Meat and animal fats industries 1.134 0.320 
Other leather industries 1.143 0.610 
Other fertilisers 1.157 0.591 
Oilseeds milling 1.177 0.615 
Other ferrous/metallic minerals 1.178 1.063 
Coal and wood distillation 1.180 0.514 
Petroleum products (petrol and lu bricants) 1.193 1.092 
Animal feed 1.195 0.266 
Elaboration of industrial flour 1.207 0.389 
Silk and manmade fibres industries 1.208 0.746 
Elaboration of spices 1.227 0.357 
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SECTOR TDRC DDRC 
Espadrilles 0.727 0.432 
Elaboration of cider 0.784 0.444 
Processed olives 0.794 0.380 
Fishery processing products (oil and meal) 0.796 0.409 
Jewellery and accessories 0.811 0.781 
Cork manufactures 0.829 0.512 
Technical leathers 0.838 0.353 
Cork first transformation 0.865 0.256 
Ceramics 0.874 0.707 
Lignite 0.884 0.841 
Oil olive and subproducts 0.900 0.208 
Other non ferrous/metallic minerals 0.904 0.786 
Natural resins 0.907 0.270 
Common salt 0.907 0.847 
Charcoal 0.912 0.486 
Masonry 0.917 0.862 
Cotton weaving and final cloths 0.920 0.417 
Limes and gypsum 0.929 0.569 
Pyrites 0.950 0.905 
Perfumes and cosmetics 0.963 0.499 
Anthracite 0.967 0.930 
Slaughterhouses 0.973 0.068 
Edible oils refinery 0.976 0.337 
Salted and dried fish 0.988 0.355 
Coal 0.989 0.929 
Furniture and other wood manufactures 0.990 0.512 
Bakery industry 0.997 0.253 
Press and graphic arts 1.003 0.652 
Coal agglomerates 1.009 0.386 
Defence industry (including aircraft) 1.042 0.506 
Organic chemistry 1.052 0.413 
Rice mills 1.055 0.169 
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